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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS B. ~lOONEY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE No. 7373 
APPELLANT'S RE·PLY BRIEF 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Since the filing of appellant's original brief, deci-
sions have come down which we believe are decisive of 
the i:ssues presented on this appeal. Certain statements 
made by respondent in its brief require answer. For 
these reasons we have concluded to write a short reply 
brief. 
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THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT PRO-
HIBITS STATE COURTS FROM DISMISSING ACTIONS ON 
THE GROUNDS OF FORUM NON CONVENIENS. 
Under Point I of its brief respondent makes the 
startling contention that by the very language of Section 
6 of the, Federal Employers' Liability Act fede~~l c01i~t~ 
only are required to accept ju~isdiction of actions 
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 
In other worqs, respondent contends that the provisions 
of Section 6 that an action inay be brought in the District 
of the residence of defendant, or h~ which the cause_ of 
&ction arose, or in which the deferid~~t shaJi be doing 
business at the time of commencing such action, are 
applicable to federal courts only. Respondent thus 
eliminates from the act the provision that "The Juris-
diction of the courts of the United States under this 
chapter shall be concurrent with that of the courts of 
the several states.'' 
We submit that ever since the enactment of this 
statute it has been uniformally interpreted and construed 
to mean that actions under the F .E.L.A. may be brought 
in state courts of jurisdiction whenever and wherever 
one or more of the three permissive factors for juris-
diction exist. Fot instance, an action under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act may be brought in the 
District Court of the Third Judicial District in and for 
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Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a court of general 
jurisdiction whenever, 
(1) The defendant resides in Salt Lake County; 
or 
(2) The cause of action arose in Salt Lake Coun-
ty: or 
(3) The defendant shall be doing business in Salt 
Lake County at the time of the commencement 
of such action. 
To hold otherwise would require the elimination of 
the foregoing quoted portion of the F.E.L.A. 
At page 25 of its brief respondent contends that 
since the enactment of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404(a) and the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ex 
Parte Collett, 69 S. Ct. 944, the holding of the United 
States Supreme Court in Baltimore & 0. R. Co. v. Kep-
ner, has been vitiated with respect to its application 
to an action brought in a federal court under the Fed-
eral Employers' Liability Act. In the first place, we 
are not here concerned with an action brought in a Fed-
eral District Court, but are concerned with an action 
brought in a district court of this state. The enactment 
of Section 1404(a) could not possibly have ahy applica-
tion to state courts. That section is applicable only to 
federal courts and provides as follows: 
''For the convenience of parties and witnesses, 
in the interest of justice, a district court may 
transfer any civil action to any other district or 
division where it might have been brought." 
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The only remedy sought by respondent in the case 
at bar was dismissal of the action and not a transfer 
to some other court. Obviously a Utah Court could not 
effectively transfer this action to a Colorado Court or 
to a Delaware Court or to a Federal Court. In the very 
recent Missouri case of State of Missouri, at the Relation 
of Southern Railway Company, a corporation, v. Waldo 
C. Mayfield, Judge of the Circuit Court of the City of St. 
Louis, Missouri, and His Successors, as Presiding Judge 
of said Court, 224 S.W. 2d 105, it was held that the 
foregoing quoted section of the United States Code has 
no application to an action brought in a state court. 
For the convenience of the court we are setting forth 
in Appendix ''A'' of this brief the Court's opinion in full. 
Another thing to be observed is that the decision in 
the Kepner case is based squarely upon a construction 
of Section 6 of the F.E.L.A., and the Collett case states 
that Section 1404(a) does not repeal that section. 
1404(a) does not purport to give the kind of relief which 
defendant here seeks, to wit: the right to a dismissal 
of the case. 
The two cases cited and relied upon extensively by 
defendant, Douglas v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 
279 U.S. 377, 49 S. Ct. 355 and Herb v. Pitcarirn, 324 U.S. 
117, 65 S. Ct. 459, do not relate to a consideration of the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens or its application to 
the F.E.L.A., cases. 
In the Douglas case a New York statute was in-
volved. There is no similar statute in the State of Utah. 
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The case set forth in Appendix ''A'' of this brief, 
and Leet v. Union Pac, R. Co., 25 Cal. 2d 605, 155 P. 
2d 42 (cert. den. 65 S. Ct. 1403), distinguish the Dou.glas 
case and hold it inapplicable. It is to be noted that the 
Douglas case was decided in 1929 and the cases relied 
upon by plaintiff herein were decided at a much later 
date. The Kepner case was decided in 1941; the Miles 
case in 1942 and the Gulf Oil Company case in 1947. 
Defendant's discussion of the Miles, Kepner and 
Gulf Oil Company cases amounts merely to an assertion 
by it that the United States Supreme Court did not 
mean what it said in those cases. There is no basis 
for defendant's statement that the language quoted 
from the Gulf Oil Company case at page 46 of appellant's 
brief relates only to actions in the federal courts. The 
language is not so limited and the Miles case there cited 
does not concern in any way an action in the federal 
courts. 
A reading of the Miles and Kepner cases discloses 
that the equitable doctrine therein asserted by the rail-
roads seeking an injunction is the same in principle as 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, it being based on 
vexation and harrassmen t. 
In the case of Boyd v. Grand Trunk Western R. Co., 
...... U. S ....... , 70 S. Ct. 26, 27, 28, the United States 
Supreme Court on November 7, 1949, concluded that the 
choice of forum given by Section 6 of the ·F.E.L.A., was 
a substantive right extended employees who came within 
the provisions of the F.E.L.A. That case confirmed the 
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holdings in the cases heretofore cited by ~ppellant! See 
Akerly v. New York Cent. R. Co., 168 Fed. 2d 812; Peter~ 
sen v. Ogden Union Railway & Depot Co .. , 110 Utah 514, 
175 P. 2d 744. 
In the Boyd case the petitioner was injured in the 
course of his duties as an employee of the railroad! On 
two occasions he had signed an agreement stipulating 
that if his claim ~ould not be settled and he elected to 
sue, such suit would be com~epced within the county or 
district where he resided at the time of his injqries, 
or i~ the cou:pty or dis·trict where his injuries were sus~ 
tained and not elsewhere. The Supreme Court held 
that this agreement was void. The court stated: 
" • * * We hold th&.t petitioner's right to 
bring the suit in any eligible forum: is a right of 
sufficient substantiality to be included within the 
Congressional mandate of Section 5 of the Liabil-
ity ~ct: 'Any contract, r-qle, regulation, or device 
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall 
be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself 
from any liability created by this Act, shall to 
that extent be void * * *.' The contract before us 
is therefore void.',. 
The court further stated: 
"The right to select the forum granted in 
Section 6 is a substantial right. It would thwart 
the express purpose of the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act to s·anction defeat of that right by 
the device at bar." 
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For the convenience of the Court we are setting forth 
in Appendix '' B '' of this brief the opinion of the United 
States Supren1e Court in full. 
The force of this language and holding can readily 
be recognized when we consider the statement made by 
the United States Supreme Court in the case of United 
States v. National City Lines, Inc. et al., 334 U. S. 573, 
68 S. Ct. 1169, 1181, 92 L. Ed. 1584, wherein it was said: 
''Finally, both appellees and the District 
Court have placed much emphasis upon this 
Court's recent decisions applying the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens and in some instances ex~ 
tending the scope of its application. Whatever 
may be the scope of its previous application or of 
its appropriate extension, the doctrine is not a 
principle of universal applicability, as those deci-
sions uniformly recognize. At least one invariable, 
limiting principle may be stated. It is that when-
ever Congress has vested courts with jurisdiction 
to hear a;nd determine causes and has inv·ested 
complaining litigants with a right of choice among 
them which is inconsistent with the exercise by 
those courts of discretionary power to defeat the 
choice so made, the doctrine can have no effect. 
Baltimore ~ 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 
8. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed .. 28, 136 A..L .. 'R. 1222,· Miles v. 
Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 62 8. Ct. 
827, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A..L.R. 1104. The question 
whether such a right has been given is usually 
the crux of the problem.. It is one not to be an-
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swered by such indecisive inquiries as whether 
the v·enue or jurisdictional statute is labeled a 
'special' or a 'general' one. Nor is it to be 
determined merely by the court's view that mprpli-
cability of the doctrine would serve the ends of 
justice in the particular case. It is rather to be 
decided, upon consideration of aU the relevant 
matermls, by whether the legislative purpose and 
the effect of the language 'USed to achieve it were to 
vest the power of choice in the plaintiff or to con-
fer power upon the courts to qualify hi's selection.'' 
At page 42 of its brief defendant contends that the 
Supreme Court of the 8tate of Utah in its order in 
cases Nos. 7326, 7327 and 7328, entitled The Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, a corporation, 
v. The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and Joseph G. Jeppson, one of the 
Judges thereof, held that the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens was an inherent power in the trial courts 
of this state. 
The Supreme Court knows the reasoning back of 
its order, but as it was understood by us, the sole ruling 
of the court in those cases was that the extraordinary 
writs sought by the railroad company were not proper 
remedies in the case and ruled solely upon that basis. 
The defendant cites cases from M·assachusetts and 
Illinois contending that the rule of forum non conveniens 
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Those states apparently do not have constitutional pro-
visions and statutes similar to those in the State of 
Utah and hence those decisions are not applicable here. 
Appellant in his brief has already cited cases from state~ 
having provisions of constitutions and statutes similar 
to the State of Utah and have held that in view of such 
provisions the doctrine of forwn non conveniens wa~ 
not applicable to their courts. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment ap.., 
pealed from should be reversed and the Court's order 
dismissing plaintiff's .action vacated, set aside and held 
for naught and the matter referred to the Third Judi-
cial District Court for trial in accordance with the laws 
and statutes of the State of Utah and the United States 
of America. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK & ROBERTS 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and A.tppellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
STATE ex rei. SOUTHERN RY. CO. v. 
MAYFIELD, Judge. 
STATE ex rei. ATCHISON, T. & S. F. RY. CO. v. 
MURPHY, Judge. 
NOS. 41461, 41558. 
Supreme Court of Missouri, en Bane. 
Oct. 10, 1949. 
Rehearing Denied Nov. 14, 1949. 
224 S. W. 2d 105. 
Original proceedings in mandamus by the State of 
Missouri on the relation of the Southern Railway Com-
pany against W~aldo C. Mayfield, Judge of the Circuit 
Court of the City of St. Louis, and his successors, as 
Presiding Judge of the court, and a like proceeding by 
the State on the relation of the Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway Company against the Honorable 
David J. Murphy, Judge of the Circuit Court of the 
City of St. Louis, and his successors, as Presiding 
Judge of the court, to compel the use of discretion in 
passing on motions by the relators to dismiss actions 
by nonresidents against relators under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act. The motions were grounded 
solely on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
Writs were quashed by the Supreme Court, Tipton, 
J., on the ground that the trial judge of a circuit court 
could not in the exercise of judicial discretion dismiss 
such an action on the sole ground of forum non con-
veniens. 
These two cases involve identical issues and for 
that reason they were consolidated for argument before 
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this court. They are original proceedings in maridamm; 
to compel the trial court to use discretion in passing 
on relators' motions to dismiss these actions brought 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. The trial 
court (William L. Mason, deceased) denied the motions 
on the sole ground that in his opinion the court had nt) 
jurisdiction or discretion to entertain or grant them. 
Relator Southern Railway Company was sued by 
Lelia M. Blevins, Administratrix, in the circuit court 
of the city of St. Louis for $100,000 for the death of he1; 
husband, based on the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act. This relator filed a motion to dismiss this actidn 
on the ground of inappropriate forum Within the doctrine 
of foru.m non conveniens. This motion alleged that the 
plaintiff was a resident of Tennessee and was appointed 
administratrix of the estate of her husband by a Tennes-
see probate court, and that her husband was also a resi-
dent of that state at the time of his death. The motion 
iurther stated that this relator was a Virginia corpora-
tion and that the alleged acts ()f negligence took place 
near the boundary line between the states of Virginia 
and Tennessee, some 700 miles from St. Louis. It further 
emphasized the added expense of trying the case lit St. 
Louis rather than at or near the p1ace the alleged 
cause of action arose and where the parties arid wit-
nesses resided. 
Floyd P. Seachris filed suit in the circuit court of 
St. Louis against the relator, the Atchison, Topeka and 
Santa Fe Railroad Company, under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act, for alleged injuries he received 
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at Waynoka, Oklahoma. This relator also filed a motior.t 
to dismiss that action under the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens. The facts alleged in this motion are similar 
to the facts alleged by the relator, the Southern Railway 
Corporation, except in this instance it is alleged that 
Waynoka is 647 miles from St. Louis. 
As previously stated, the trial court denied these 
motions. The ground for the denial of each of these 
motions was that the ''Court has no jurisdiction or dis-
cretion to entertain or grant such a motion.'' 
The sole· question before us is : May a trial judge 
of a circuit court of this state exercise his judicial dis-
cretion in determining whether to retain or relinquish 
jurisdiction of a case brought under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act when a motion to dismiss on the 
sole ground of forum non conveniens is presented before 
him for a ruling¥ 
In the case of Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, 330 
U.S. 501, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 67 S. Ct. 839, I.e. 841-842, 
the Supreme Court of the United States said: 
"It is true that in cases under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §51 et seq., we have held 
that plaintiff's choice of a forum cannot be defeated on 
the basis of forum non conveniens. But this was because 
the special venue act under which those cases are brought 
was believed to require it. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. 
Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S. Ct. 6, 86 L. Ed. 28, 136 
A.L.R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 
698, 62 S. Ct. 827,86 L. Ed. 1129, 146 A.L.R. 1104. Those 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
decisions do not purport to modify the doctrine as to 
other cases governed by the general venue statutes." 
That court upheld the Federal District Court of 
New York, 62 F. Supp. 219, when it dismissed the 
plaintiff's suit on the ground that the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens applied. But that action was brought 
under the general venue statute. It was not a Federal 
Employers' Liability case. 
In the case of Ex Parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 
944, 945, 93 L. Ed. 901, l.c. 903 and 904-905, the Supreme 
Court of the United States said: 
''Prior to the current revision of title 28 of thJ 
United States Code, forum non conveniens was not avail-
able in Federal Employers' Liability Act suits. Balti-
more&; 0. R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 86 L. Ed. 28, 
62 S. Ct. 6, 136 A.L.R. 1222 (1941); Miles v. Illinois C. 
R. Co., 315 U.S. 698, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 62 S. Ct. 827, 
146 A.L.R. 1104 (1942); see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 
330 U. S. 501, 505, 91 L. Ed. 1055, 1060, 67 S. Ct. 839 
(1947). The new Code, however, provides that 'For the 
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of 
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action 
to any other district or division where it might have 
been brought.' This is § 1404 (a)." 
''Section 6 of the Liability Act defines the proper 
forum; § 1404 (a) of the Code deals with the right to 
transfer an action properly brought. The two section::; 
deal with two separate and distinct problems. Section 
1404 (a) does not limit or otherwise modify any right 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
granted in § '6 of the Li~bility Act or elsewhere to bring 
suit in a particular district. An action m~y still be 
brought in any court, state or federal, in which it might 
have been brought previously. 
''The Code, therefore, does not repeal § 6 of the 
F~deral Employers' Liability Act.'' 
Section 1404 (a), supra, became effective September 
1, 1948, and applies only to civil suits brought in the 
federal co~rts. It has no applicatiQp tq feqer~l Em-
ployer$' J.;iabilit! s11its bFQllg~t in st~te cpurt~. W ~ 
have no machinery to transfer these two cas~s, one tq 
the state or federal courts of Tennessee and the other 
to the courts of Oklahoma. Relators do not contend that 
- ., 
this section applies to the problem before us. They do 
not ask that the two suits in q~estion be transferred 
but they rely upon the common l~w doct~ine of forun~ 
non conveniens which calls- for a dismissal of the action. 
''While the subst~nt~al factors to be . we!ghed ·in 
determini:Q.g ~ mQtio~ under Sect~P,n +~04 ( ~) ~ay b~ 
similar to those involve<} in a conslqeration of forum 
non conveniens, yet it seems clear that transfer under 
Section 1404 (a) is something more than and somewhat 
different from dismissal under forum non conveniens. 
In the first place, the procedure to be followed in affirma-
tively invoking the two remedies is drastically different. 
Under Section 1404 (a) a case is not dis~i~sed but 
merely transferred to the more convenie:q.t forum; "!lnder 
forum non conveniens a c~se is dismissed and must be 
instituted anew in the more convenient forum, carrying 
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with it the inherent and jeopardous hazard of being 
barred therein by the statute of limitations. The danger 
of having the action barred in such a manner was one 
bf the principal reasons for Mr. Justice Black's dissent 
in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 1947, 330 U.S. 501, 516, 
67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055. 
''The doctrine of forum DO If. conveniens has been 
held inapplicable to cases instituted under 'speeial v~nu~' 
statutes, such as actions arising under the Feder~l Erp-
ployers' Liability Act and the anti-trust laws. Such 
types of cases may be transferred under Section 1404 (a), 
however. Ex parte Collett, 1949, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S. Ct.. 
944 (959); United States v. National City Lines, 1949, 
337 U.S. 78, 69 S. Ct. 955 ( 959). In this respect, then, 
the two remedies are also different." U.S.D.C., Del~ 
(Rodney, J.); Cinema Amu.sements, Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 
June 10, 1949, 85 F. Supp. 319, 322. 
Thus, with ref~rence to Federal Employer~' Liabi~­
ity actions brought in state courts the law is the same 
now as it was before Section 1404 (a) was enacted. 
The case of Baltimore and Ohio. R. Co. v. Kepn~r, 
314 U. S. 44, 86 L. Ed. 28, 62 S. Ct. 6, I.e. 9~10, was 
a suit brought in a state court of Ohio against an injured 
resident employe of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
to enjoin him from prosecuting a suit he instituted in 
the United States District Court of New York under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act for an injury he re-
ceived in the State of Ohio. The Supreme Court of 
Ohio denied the injunction. Upon application of the 
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railroad, the Supreme Court of the United States issued 
its writ of certiorari to review the Ohio decision. In 
affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
that court said : 
"That real contention of petitioner is that despite the 
admitted venue respondent is acting in a vexatious 
and inequitable manner in maintaining the federal court 
suit in a distant jurisdiction when a convenient and 
suitable forum is at respondent's doorstep." 
We read the opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio 
to express the view that if it were not for Section 6 of 
the Employers' Liability Act the requested injunction 
would be granted on the undisputed facts of the petition. 
Section 6 establishes venue for an action in the federal 
courts. As such venue is a privilege created by federal 
statute and claimed by respondent the Supreme Court 
of Ohio felt constrained by the Supremacy Clause to 
treat Section 6 as decisive of the issue. It is clear that 
the allowance or denial of this federal privilege is a 
matter of federal law, not a mat,ter of state law under 
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 72, 58 S. Ct. 
817, 819, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487. Its correct 
decision depends upon a construction of a federal act. 
Consequently the action of a state court must be in accord 
with the federal statute and the federal rule as to its 
application rather than state statute, rule or policy. 
''Petitioner presses upon us the argument that the 
action of Congress gave an injured railway employet_~ 
the privilege of extended venue, subject to the usual 
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powers of the state to enjoin what in the judgment of 
the state courts would be considered an improper use 
of that privilege. This results, says petitioner, because 
the Act does not in terms exclude this state power. As 
courts of equity admittedly possessed this power before 
the enactment of Section 6, the argument continues, it 
is not to be lightly inferred that the venue privilege 
was in disregard of this policy. But the federal courta 
have felt they could not interfere with suits in far 
federal districts where the inequity alleged was based 
only on inconvenience. There is no occasion to distinguish 
between the power and the propriety of its exercise 
in this instance since the limits of the two are here 
co-extensive. The privilege was granted because the 
general venue provisions worked injustices to employees. 
It is obvious that no state statute could vary the venue 
and we think equally true that no state court may inter-
fere with the privilege, for the benefit of the carrier or 
the national transp<>rtation system, on the ground of 
inequity based on cost, inconvenience or harrassment. 
When the section was enacted it filled the entire field 
of venue in federal courts. A privilege of venue granted 
by the legislative body which created this right of 
action cannot be frustrated for reasons of convenience 
or expense~ If it is deemed unjust, the remedy is legi8-
lative, a court followed in securing the amendment of 
April 5, 1910, for the benefit of employees.'' 
The case of Miles v. Illinois Central R. Co., 315 
U. S. 698, 86 L. Ed. 1129, 62 S. Ct. 827, I.e. 830-831, 
146 A.L.R. 1104, was a suit to review the action of the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Tennessee Court of Appeals which had enjoined the 
plaintiff, a resident of Tennessee, froni prosecuting a 
suit under the Federal En1ployers' Liability Act· in the 
Circuit court of St. Louis, Missouri, for the death of her 
husband which occurred in Tennessee while working for 
the railroad. In ruling the case the court said : 
''In the legislative history of section 6, the provision 
that removal may not be had from a 'State court of 
competent jurisdiction' was added to the House bill 
on the floor of the Senate and later accepted by the 
House, in order to assure a hearing to the employee in 
a state court. Words were simultaneously adopted rec-
ognizing the jurisdiction of the state courts by providing 
that the federal jurisdiction should he concurrent. The 
venue of state court suits was lef.t to the practice of 
the forum. The opportunity to present causes of action 
arising under the F.E.L.A. in the state courts came; 
however, not from the state law but from the federal. 
By virtue of the Constitution, the courts of the several 
states must remain open to such litigants on the saml~ 
basis ,that they are open to litigants with causes of action 
springing from a different source. This is so because 
the Federal Constitution makes the laws of the United 
States the supreme law of the land, binding on every 
citizen and every court and enforceable wherever juris-
diction is adequate for the purpose * * * 
''Since the existence of the cause of action and the 
privilege of vindicating rights under the F.E.L.A. in 
state courts spring from federal law, the right to sue 
in state courts of proper venue where their jurisdiction 
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is adequate is of the same quality as the right to sue in 
federal courts. It is no more subject to interference 
by state action than was the federal venue in the Kepner 
case * ~ •. 
''The permission granted by Congress to sue in 
state courts may be exercised only where the carrier is 
found doing business. If suits in federal district courts 
at those points do not unduly burden interstate com-
merce, suits in similarly located state courts cannot be 
burdensome. As Congress has permitted both the state 
and federal suits, its determination that the carriers 
must bear the incidental burden is a determination that 
the state courts may not treat the normal expense and 
inconvenience of trial in permitted places, such as the 
one selected here, as inequitable and unconscionable.'' 
Thus, it is clear that under the Kepner and Miles 
cases, supra, a state court cannot dismiss a Federal Em-
ployers' Liability case solely under the forum non con-
veniens doctrine. 
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act, as interp_ret-
ed by Kepner, increases the number of p!laces where the 
defendant may be sued and makes him accept the plain-
tiff's choice" (Italics ours). Gulf Oil Corporation v. 
Gilbert, supra, 67 S. Ct. 839, I.e. 842. 
Relators rely mainly upon the case of Douglas v. 
New York, N.H. & H. R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 73 L. Ed. 
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747, 49 S. Ct. 355. In that case a resident of Connecticut 
brought a suit in a state court of New York under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act against the defendant, 
a Connecticut corporation, for personal injuries inflicted 
in Connecticut. The trial court dismissed the action 
under a statute which it held gave it discretion in suits 
brought by non-resident plaintiffs. The trial court action 
was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals, 248 
N.Y. 580, 1'62 N.E. 532. This was the -statute in ques-
tion : ''An action against a foreign corporation may be 
maintained by another foreign corporation, or by a non-
resident, in one of the following cases only: • * * 4. 
Where a foreign corporation is doing business with-
in this State.'' Code Civ. Proc., Sec. 1780. 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that 
this statute was not in violation of Article 4, Section 
2, of the Constitution of the United States, as discrimin-
ating between citizens of New York and citizens of other 
states when construed as using the word ''resident'' in 
the strict primary sense of one actually living in the 
place for a time, irrespective of domicile. Such was the 
construction placed upon this statute by the New York 
Court of Appeals. It also held that state courts are not 
required to entertain suits under the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act but are empowered to do so. 
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We do not think this case sustains the relatOJ.'. 
The con1mon la.w doctrine of forum non conveniens is 
not even mentioned in the opinion. In the first place, 
:Missouri does not have a statute similar to the New 
York statute which the courts of that state have held 
to give them discretionary power to dismiss an action 
brought by a non-resident as distinguished from a citizen 
of another state. Also, Missouri permits citizens of this 
state to file Federal Employers' Liability cases in its 
courts. To deny the same privilege to citizens of another 
state would violate Article 4, Section 2, of the Consti-
tution of the United States. 
Relators also rely upon the case of Chambers v. 
Baltimore &!; Ohio Railroad Co., 207 U. S. 142, 28 S. Ct. 
34, I.e. 36, 52 L. Ed. 143. In that case the wife of an 
employe brought suit in a state court of Ohio for injuries 
received by her husband in Pennsylvania which caused 
his death. Both the husband and wife were residents of 
the latter state. The court held that an Ohio statute 
which permits suits in Ohio state courts for wrongful 
death occurring in another state only when the decedent 
was a citizen of Ohio did not violate the Privileges and 
Immunity Clause of the Federal Constitution (Article 
4, Section 2). In ruling the case, that court said: 
"The courts were open in such cases to plaintiffs 
who were citizens of other states if the deceased wa::; 
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a citizen of Ohio; they were closed to plaintiffs who 
were citizens of Ohio if the deceased was a citizen of 
another state. So far as the parties to the litigation 
are concerned, the state, by its laws, made no discrimina-
tion based on citizenship, and offered precisely the same 
privileges to citizens of other states which it allowed 
to its own. There is, therefore, at lease a literal con-
formity with the requirements of the Constitution." 
The opinion in the Chambers case deals only with 
the constitutionality of a state statute; it does not men-
tion the Federal Employers' Liability Act nor the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens. This state does not 
have any such statute. We fail to see its applicability 
to the issue before us. 
The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not 
compel the courts of this state to hear cases arising 
under that act, but it empowers our courts to do so. 
Since Missouri does allow its citizens to maintain 
Federal Employers' Liability ,actions in its courts (see 
the many such cases listed in the Missouri Digest, Ma::;-
ter and Servant, 85), it follows that not to allow citizen8 
of other states the right to file Federal Employers' Lia-
bility suits in our state courts would violate Article 4, 
Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States. 
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The relators do not co:ntenq that the circuit court 
<>f St. Louis does not have jurisdiction of the parties 
or of the subject matter of these two suits, or that 
there is any state statute that would prohibit maintaining 
these suits in our state courts, but their sole contention 
is that the common law doctrine of forum non conveniens 
should be open to them in these cases. Under the Kepner 
and Miles cases, sup:va, the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens is not open to relators in the two Federal Em-
ployers' Liability cases in question. 
Respondents also contend that under our Constitu-
tion and statutes the doctrine of forum non conveniens 
cannot be recognized in Missouri. Since we have already 
ruled the trial court had no discretion in Federal Em-
ployers' Liability cases, it is not necessary to discuss 
the Missouri law upon that subject. 
From what we have said,· it follows that our writ 
should be quashed. It is so ordered. 
ERNEST M. TIPTON, Judge 
All concur. 
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APPENDIX "B" 
BOYD vs. GRAND TRUNK WESTERN R. CO., 
70S. Ct. 26 
No.17. 
Argued Oct. 11, 1949. 
Decided Nov. 7, 1949. 
PER CURIAM. 
In issue here is the validity of a contract restrict-
ing the choice of venue for an action based upon the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act.1 Petitioner was in-
jured in the course of his duties as an employee of 
respondent railroad in November, 1946. Twice during 
the following month petitioner was advanced fifty dol-
lars by respondent. On each of these occasions peti-
tioner signed an agreement stipulating that if his claim 
could not be settled and he elected to sue, ''such suit 
shall be commenced within the county or district where 
I resided at the time my injuries were sustained, or 
in the county or district where my injuries were sustained 
1 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51, 45 U.S.C.A. 
Sec. 51. 
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and not elsewhere. " 2 Although this provisiOn defined 
the available forun1 as either the Circuit Court of Cal-
houn County, :Michigan, or the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of ~fichigan, petitioner 
brought an action in the Superior Court of Cook County, 
Illinois. To enjoin petitioner's prosecution of the Illinois 
case, respondent instituted this suit. The Michigan Cir-
cuit Court held that the contract restricting the choice 
of venue was void and dismissed the suit. The Michigan 
Supreme Court reversed, 1948, 321 Mich. 693, 33 N.W. 
2d 120. 
Certiorari was granted, 1949, 337 U. S. 923, '69 
S. Ct. 1166, because the federal and state courts which 
have considered the issue have reached conflicting 
results;'l We agree with those courts which have held 
2 The agreement also provided that the sums advanced would 
be deducted from whatever settlement or recovery petitioner 
finally achieved. As to this, the proviso in Sec. 5 of the Liability 
Act specifies "That in any action brought against any such common 
carrier under or by virtue of any of the provisions of this Act, 
such common carrier may set off therein any sum it has contributed 
or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have 
been paid to the injured employee or the person entitled thereto on 
account of the injury or death for which said action was 'brought." 
Referring to this provision, and interpreting a contract similar to 
the one here involved, at least one federal court has held that 
"The contract to waive the venue provisions is of no effect * * * 
because there was no consideration for it.'' Akerly v. New York 
Cent. R. Co., 6 Cir., 1948, 168 F. 2d 812, 815. 
sIn accord with the decision below are: Roland v. Atchison, 
T. & S. F. R. Co., D.C.N.D. Ill. 1946, 65 F. Supp. 630; Herrington 
v. Thompson, D.C.W.D. Mo. 1945, 61 F. Supp. 903; ·Clark v. Low-
den, D.C.D. Minn. 1942, 48 F. Supp. 261; Detwiler v. Chicago, R. 
I. & P. R. Co., D.C.D. Minn. 1936, 15 F. Supp. 541; Detwiler v. 
Lowden, 1936, 198 Minn. 185, 188, 269 N.W. 367, 369, 838, 107 
A.L.R. 1054, 1059. In conflict with the ruling before us are: 
Krenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 2 Cir., 1949, 17 4 F. 2d 556, peti-
tion for certiorari denied 70 S. Ct ... , infra; Akerly v. New York 
Cent. R. Co., 6 Cir., 1948, 168 F. 2d 812; Fleming v. Husted, 
D.C.D. Iowa 1946, 68 F. Supp. 900; Sherman v. Pere Marquette 
R. Co., D;C.N.D. Ill. 1945, 62 F. Supp. 590; Peterson v. Ogden 
Union Railway & Depot Co., 1946, 110 Utah 573, 175 P. 2d 7 44; 
cf. Porter v. Fleming, D.C.D. Minn. 1947, 74 F. Supp. 378. 
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that contracts limiting the choice of venue are void as 
conflicting with the Liability Act. 
(1) Section 6 of the Liability Act provides that 
"Under this Act an action. may be brought in a district 
court of the United States, in the district of the residence 
of the defendant, or in which the cause of action arose, 
or in which the defendant shall be doing business at 
the time of commencing such action. The jurisdiction 
of the courts of the United States under this Act shaH 
be concurrent with that of the courts of the several 
States, ,and no case arising under this Act and brought 
in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be 
removed to any court of the United States." It is not 
disputed that respondent is liable to suit in Cook County, 
Illinois, in accordance with this provision. We hold 
that petitioner's right to bring the suit in any eligible 
forum is a right of sufficient substantiality to be included 
within the Congressional mandate of Section 5 of the 
Liability Act: ''Any contract, rule, regulation, or device 
whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to 
enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any 
liability created by this Act, shali to that extent be 
void * • * '' The contract before us is therefore void. 
(2) Any other result would be inconsistent with 
Duncan v. Thompson, 1942, 315 U.S. 1, 62 S. Ct. 422, 
86 L. Ed. 575. That opinion reviewed the legislative 
history and concluded that ''Congress wanted Section 
5 to have the full effect that its comprehensive phrase-
ology implies." 315 U.S. at page 6, 62 S. Ct. at page 424. 
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In that case '!ls in this, the contract before the Court 
was signed after the injury occurred. The court below, 
in holding that an agreement delimiting venue should 
be enforced if it was reached after the accident, dis-
regarded Duncan. 
(3) The vigor and validity of the Duncan decision 
was not impaired by Callen v. Pennsylvania R. Co.; 
1948, 332 U.S. 625, 68 S. Ct. 296, 92 L. Ed. 242. We 
there distinguished a full compromise enabling the 
parties to settle their dispute without litigation, which 
we held did not contravene the Act, from a device which 
obstructs the right of the Liability Act plidntiff to 
secure the maximum recovery if he should elect judicial 
trial of his cause! And nothing in Ex parte Collett, 1949, 
337 U. S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 944, affects the initial choice of 
venue afforded Liability Act plaintiffs. We stated 
expressly that the section of the Judicial Code there 
involved, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1404 (a), 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1404 
(a), "does not limit or otherwise modify any right 
granted in Section 6 of the Liability Act or elsewhere to 
bring suit in a particular district. An action may still 
be brought in any court, state or federal, in which it 
might have been brought previously." 337 U. S. at page 
60, 69 S. Ct. at page 947. 
The right to select the forum granted in Section 6 
is a substantial right. It would thwart the express pur-
4 See Krenger supra note 3, 174 F. 2d at page 558; 174 F. 
2d at page 561 (concurring opinion of L. Hand, C. J.); Akerly, 
supra note 3, 168 F. 2d at page 815; Peterson, supra note 3, 110 
Utah at page 579, 175 P. 2d at page 747. 
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pose of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to sanction 
defeat of that right by the device at bar. 
Reversed. 
Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice JACKSON 
concur in the result but upon the grounds stated by 
Chief Judge Hand in K renger v .. Pennsylvania R. Co., 
2 Cir., 1949, 174 F. 2d 556, at page 560. 
Mr. Justice DouGLAS and Mr. Justice MINTON took 
no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
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